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  This paper presents an empirical investigation to study the effects of corporate governance on 
risk taking  of  private  insurance  firms  and  banks  in Iran. The  proposed study of this paper 
considers the financial information of 13 banks and 19 private insurance firms over the period 
2006-2011 in Iran. The study investigates the effects of five variables including size, CEO 
duality task, composition of  the  board  of directors, ownership concentration and  having  an 
internal auditing system on risk taking of private banks and insurance firms in Iran. Using some 
panel data  and regression analysis,  the study confirms  the positive  effect of the  ownership 
concentration as well as negative impact of non-bound board members on risk taking.   
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1. Introduction 
 
For years, there have been tremendous efforts to detect various factors influencing insurance firms 
(García-Marco & Robles-Fernández, 2008; Matthews, 2007). Rahman et al. (2012) provided some 
evidence on the relationship between ownership structure and bank risk taking, and the impacts of 
capital regulation on the association on Malaysian commercial banks over the periods 1995–2008. 
They reported that ownership structure of Malaysian banks exerts positive influences on the banking 
institutions; indicating that the existence of large shareholders in Malaysian banks reduces bank risk 
taking and increases bank stability. They also reported that capital regulation plays an essential role in 
impacting ownership on bank risk taking. However, higher capital regulation had unintended impacts 
whereby banks could response to the regulation by increasing their risk taking. The findings thus, 
implied that agency hypothesis associated with expropriation of banks creditors’ interest by large 
shareholders and the role of high capital regulation in reducing bank risk taking could not be used for 
Malaysian banks.    12  
Adams and Ferreira (2007) analyzed the consequences of the board's dual role as advisor as well as 
monitoring management and reported that the CEO could face a trade-off in disclosing information to 
the board whenever he disclosed his information. Adams and Mehran (2003, 2005), in other work, 
investigated the corporate performance, board structure and its determinants in the banking industry. 
Andres and Vallelado (2008) applied a sample of large international commercial banks to examine 
hypotheses on the dual role of boards of directors. They used a two step system estimator to solve the 
well-known endogeneity problem in corporate governance literature, and showed the empirical and 
theoretical superiority of system estimator over OLS (Byrd & Hickman, 1992; Bhagat & Black, 2001) 
and within estimators. They detected an inverted U-shaped relation between bank performance and 
board size, and between the proportion of non-executive directors and performance. They explained 
that bank board composition and size were associated with directors’ ability to monitor and to advise 
management. Coles et al. (2008) reexamined the relationship between firm value and board structure 
and reported that complex firms, which have bigger advising requirements than simple firms, keep 
larger boards with more outside directors. The relationship between Tobin's Q and board size was U-
shaped, which, at face value, implied that either very small or very large boards could be optimal. 
Nevertheless, this arises from differences between complex and simple firms and Tobin's Q could 
increase  (decrease)  in  board  size  for  complex  (simple)  business  units.  Boards  of  directors  and 
corporate governance continue to absorb the attention of practitioners and scholars alike (Megginson  
et al., 1994; Davis  et al, 1997; Dalton & Dalton, 2005; Jensen & Meckling, 1976).  
Calomiris and Mason (2003) presented a comprehensive review on fundamentals, panics, and bank 
distress during the depression. Eling and Marek (2011) presented a corporate governance and risk 
taking by looking into some evidence from European insurance markets. Franks and Mayer (2001) 
investigated on  ownership and control  of  German  corporations.   Hermalin and  Weisbach (1991, 
2001) investigated the effects of board composition and direct incentives on firm performance. John 
and Senbet (1998) also performed an investigation on corporate governance and board effectiveness. 
Johnson et al. (2000) did a comprehensive survey on corporate governance in the Asian financial 
crisis. They reported that in countries with weak corporate governance, worse economic prospects 
result in more expropriation by managers and thus a larger fall in asset prices. Klein et al. (2005) 
studied  corporate  governance,  family  ownership  and  firm  value  in  the  context  of  Canadian 
corporations.  Lipton  and  Lorsch  (1992)  presented  a  modest  proposal  for  improved  corporate 
governance. They presented a proposal for improved corporate governance, which could be applied 
voluntarily  by  business  corporations  and  their  boards,  without  relying  on  changes  in  laws, 
regulations, court decisions, or shareholder behavior.  
2. The proposed study 
In this paper,  we present a regression model to  consider the relationship between risk and some 
variables including size of firm, size of board of directors as follows, 
RT = α + β1BRDSZE +β2OUTDIR + β3OWNCON + β4DUAL +  β5INTAUD  + β6SIZE + β7LEV + ɛ,  (1) 
 
where BRDSZE represents the size of board of directors, OUTDIR states the ratio of non-bound board 
members  to  total  board  of  directors  and  OWNCON  represents  ownership  concentration,  which 
represents the portion of the shareholders who own at least 5% of shares. In addition, DUAL is a 
dummy variable, which is one if the CEO is the chairman or vice chairman of the board and zero, 
otherwise, INTAUD is equal to one if the unit has independent auditor, and zero, otherwise. SIZE 
represents the size of the firm, which is calculated by taking a natural logarithm of the total assets and 
LEV represents the leverage and it is the last independent variable, which is calculated as Leverage= 
debt/asset. The dependent variable, risk taking (RT), is calculated by Z-SCORE as follows, 
Z = (ROA + CAP) / σROA,  
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where ROA states return on assets, which is calculated as the ratio of net profit divided by total assets, 
CAP is the ratio of total equities to total assets and finally, σROA is the standard deviation of ROA. 
The proposed study of this paper considers the following main hypothesis, 
Main  hypothesis:  Corporate  governance  influences on  risk  taking of private  insurance  firms  and 
banks. 
The proposed study considers the following sub-hypotheses, 
1.  Size of firms influences on risk taking of private insurance firms and banks. 
2.  CEO duality task influences on risk taking of private insurance firms and banks. 
3.  Composition of the board of directors influences on risk taking of private insurance firms and 
banks. 
4.  Ownership concentration influences on risk taking of private insurance firms and banks. 
5.  Having  internal  auditing  system  influences  on  risk  taking  of  private  insurance  firms  and 
banks. 
The proposed study of this paper considers the financial information of 13 banks and 19 private 
insurance firms over the period 2006-2011 in Iran. In summary, there were 152 data with 40 missing 
data. Table 1 demonstrates the summary of some basic statistics associated with the proposed study 
of this paper. 
Table 1 
The summary of some basic statistics 
Variable   Num.   Mean   Standard deviation   Variance   Skewness   Kurtosis   
Deviation  
Skewness   Kurtosis  
Risk taking   152  12.48  9.249  85.538  2.393  8.442  12.162  21.587 
BRDSZE   152  5.434  1.403  1.969  1.594  4.632  8.1  11.844 
OUTDIR   152  0.675  0.211  0.045  -0.87  0.006  -4.421  0.014 
OWNCON   152  60.765  27.086  733.655  -0.3  -1.064  -1.525  -2.722 
Lev   152  0.738  0.204  0.042  -1.064  0.342  -5.409  0.876 
Size   152  15.733  3.299  10.882  1.819  6.658  9.246  17.026 
 
In our survey, 28.3% of the CEO had more than one responsibility and the rest of 71.7% hold more 
than one position. In addition, 59.2% of the firms had independent auditors while 40.8% of them did 
not have  independent  internal auditor. Next,  we need  to make  sure about the normality of data, 
choosing between panel data as well as fixed or random effect. Table 2 shows details of our survey on 
some related statistics. The results of Table 2 indicate that data are not normally distributed. Table 3 
also shows details of our survey to detect whether we should choose random effect or fixed effect. 
Table 2 
The summary of Kolmogorov-Smirnov, Shapiro-Wilk, Jarque- bera 
Variable   Number   Kolmogorov-Smirnov   Shapiro-Wilk   Jarque- bera  
Statistics   Sig.    Statistics   Sig.    Statistics   Sig.   
Risk taking   152  0.352   0  0.748  0  188.0194   0  
BRDSZE   152  0.19  0  0.906  0  18.80204   0.000083  
OUTDIR   152  0.128  0  0.94  0  9.471653   0.008775  
OWNCON   152  0.125  0  0.883  0  28.66623   0.000001  
Lev   152  0.101  0.001  0.865  0  341.7748   0  
Size   152  0.177  0  0.789  0  531.8408   0  
 
Based on the results of Table 3, we need to choose random effect along with panel data. Next, we 
need  to  make  sure  there  is  a  linear  relationship  among  independent  variables  and  there  is  no 
autocorrelation between residuals. Table 4 shows details of our Durbin-Watson and F-value tests.   14  
Table 3 
The results of Chow and Huasman tests 
Model   Aim   
Chow test   Hausman test  
Statistics    F   Sig.   Result   Chi-Square   Sig.   Result  
1   Pooled   1.437002   0.2146   Equal intercept   -   -   -  
Panel   14.57773   0   Not equal slope   0   1   Random effect  
2  
Pooled   1.45163   0.2097   Equal intercept   -   -   -  
Panel   24.726634   0   Not equal slope   0   1   Random effect  
 
Table 4 
The summary of Durbin-Watson and F-value 
Model   Linear relationship   Watson - Durbin   Residuals   
F-value   Sig.   D-W   Range   J_B   Sig.  
First   5.848351   0.000059   1.512872   2.5-1.5   212.8978   0.000  
Second   16.37016   0   1.759467   2.5-1.5   207.7939   0.000  
 
The results of Table 4 show that Durbin-Watson values are within acceptable limits and F-value as 
well as J_B values are statistically significant. Finally, the implementation of Pearson correlation did 
not  indicate  a  strong  correlation  among  independent  variables.  Therefore,  we  can  examine  the 
hypotheses based on the results of the regression models.  
3. The results 
In this section, we present details of our findings on testing various hypotheses of the survey.  
3.1. The first model 
The first model of this survey considers the effects of independent variables on risk taking and the 
results are as follows, 
       RT = 11.500 - 1.025BRDSZE + 1.790DUAL + 19.215OUTDIR - 0.086OWNCON -1.862INTAUD 
t-value    1.6459      -0.777               1.158                 2.076                    -2.869                 -1.92     
Sig.          0.1019     0.4386              0.2487               0.0396                   0.0047                0.0568 
F-value = 5.848351 (Sig. = 0.000059)   Durbin-Watson = 1.51   Adjusted R-Square = 0.138 
 
Based on the results of regression analysis, we can state that F-value is statistically significance and 
Durbin-Watson is equal to 1.51, which are within desirable values. The results of regression analysis 
indicate that the coefficients of three variables of BRDSZE, DUAL and INTAUD are not meaningful 
when the level of significance is five percent. However, the coefficients of OUTDIR and OWNCON 
are statistically meaningful when the level of significance is five percent. In other words, only two 
variables have important effects on risk taking, namely, the ownership concentration as well as non-
bound board members. In other words, when the number of non-bound board members increases, we 
may expect more risk and as the major shareholder increases the risk decreases. Therefore, the third 
and fourth sub-hypotheses of the survey have been confirmed but the other sub-hypotheses are not 
confirmed.  
3.2. The second model 
The second model of this survey considers the effects of independent variables in the presence of 
control variables on risk taking and the results are as follows, 
    RT =20.16       -0.063BRDSZE+0.0324DUAL+11.82OUTDIR-0.073OWNCON -0.1938INTAUD -25.62 LEV+ 0.544SIZE 
t-value  4.15      -0.0968           0.0444               2.343             -4.213                 -0.307             -19.175        3.084   
Sig.       0.0001  0.9230            0.9646                0.0205            0.000                0.7589                 0.0000      0.0024 
F-value = 16.37 (Sig. = 0.000000)   Durbin-Watson = 1.759467   Adjusted R-Square = 0.416 
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Based on the results of regression analysis, we can observe that F-value is statistically significance 
and Durbin-Watson is equal to 1.51, which are within desirable values. The results of regression 
analysis indicate that the coefficients of three variables of BRDSZE, DUAL and INTAUD are not 
meaningful when the level of significance is five percent. However, the coefficients of OUTDIR and 
OWNCON and two control variables of LEV and SIZE are statistically meaningful when the level of 
significance is five percent. In other words, only two independent variables have important effects on 
risk taking,  namely,  the ownership  concentration as well as non-bound board  members. In other 
words, when the number of non-bound board members increases, we may expect more risk and as the 
major shareholder increases the risk decreases. Therefore, the third and fourth sub-hypotheses of the 
survey have been confirmed but the other sub-hypotheses are not confirmed in the presence of two 
control variables.  
4. Conclusion 
In  this  paper,  we  have  presented  an  empirical  investigation  to  study  the  effects  of  corporate 
governance on risk taking of some private banks and insurance firms. The proposed study of this 
paper has gathered the necessary information from 13 banks and 19 private insurance firms over the 
period 2006-2011 in Iran. Using some statistical tests, the study has determined that the ownership 
concentration  as  well  as  non-bound  board  members  could  influence  risk  taking  in  banking  and 
insurance industry. Table 5 shows the summary of testing various hypotheses, 
Table 5 
The summary of testing the effects of various factors on risk taking 
Hypothesis  Independent variable  Dependent variable  Result 
First  Size of firms  Risk taking  Not confirmed 
Second  CEO duality task  Risk taking  Not confirmed 
Third  Composition of the board of directors  Risk taking  Confirmed 
Forth  Ownership concentration  Risk taking  Confirmed 
Fifth  Having internal auditing system  Risk taking  Not confirmed 
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